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ARTICLE 9 IN REVISION: A PROPOSAL FOR





As we practitioners address in this Symposium the issue of
whether the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is dead or alive, many
of us will focus upon our "pet peeves." These are those little annoy-
ances that arise in our practice when we whimsically find that the lan-
guage of the UCC first appears to help us reach a result for a client
but does not actually do so. Many of you who read this'paper may
conclude that it addresses merely one commercial lawyer's favorite
pet peeve in an isolated area of practice. I urge you, however, to read
on.
The question that I raise in this Essay is whether a secured party
should be permitted to take a security interest in otherwise nonassign-
able rights that the debtor may have obtained from contracts with
third parties or from licenses or permits-which I shall refer to gener-
ally herein as "permits"-issued by federal, state, or local governmen-
tal agencies. This question, which surfaced in the deliberations of the
Article 9 Study Committee appointed by the Permanent Editorial
Board (PEB) of the UCC, eventually became Study Committee Rec-
ommendation No. 23.1 It is likely that this question will be addressed
* Edwin E. Smith is a partner in the Boston office of Bingham, Dana & Gould and
was a member of the UCC Article 9 Study Committee. As a Massachusetts Uniform Law
Commissioner, he is currently serving on the UCC Article 9 Drafting Committee. The
Author is grateful to the members of the UCC Article 9 Study Committee, and especially
to its Reporters, Professors Harris and Mooney, for their invaluable assistance in the for-
mulation of a number of the ideas and concepts set forth in this Essay.
1. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT § 23 (Dec. 1,1992) [hereinafter
STUDY GROUP REPORT].
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as the Article 9 Drafting Committee2 attempts to revise Article 9 to
meet today's commercial needs.3
The answer to this question may be an important component in
the answer to the larger question raised in this Symposium: whether
the UCC is dead or alive. I say this, because, while the UCC may be
alive today in our daily practices, many aspects of it are aging. For it
to continue to have the vitality with which we have become accus-
tomed in our practices, we need to be sensitive to areas where the
economy, on which the text of the existing UCC was based, has
changed. In so doing, we must consider where old concepts and ap-
proaches should be adjusted and where new concepts and approaches
should be considered.
For purposes of this discussion, I will first mention why the is-
sue-whether a secured party should be permitted to take a security
interest in otherwise nonassignable rights that the debtor may have in
either contracts or permits-is an important one. Second, I will give
several examples of cases where the issue is likely to arise. Third, I
will comment briefly upon some recent cases at the federal level.
Fourth, I will make suggestions how a revised Article 9 might address
the issue. Finally, for purposes of completeness, I will set forth what
may be recognized as the limitations of a revised Article 9 in address-
ing the issue.
II. IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE
The issue of whether the debtor can grant a security interest in its
rights in otherwise nonassignable contracts and permits is primarily
important in the context of what are commonly referred to as secured
"cash flow" credit facilities extended by institutional lenders. In these
secured credit facilities, the debtor's ability to repay the lender is
predicated on the debtor continuing in business and generating the
cash flow to service the debt. Often the size of the credit facility, or
the amount of credit extended, is based upon a projection of the earn-
ings that the debtor should generate over the loan's term. The lender
2. The Article 9 Drafting Committee is appointed by the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws. Agreement Describ-
ing the Relationship of the American Law Institute, The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, and the Permanent Editorial Board with Respect to the
Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in 64 A.L.I. PROc. 769, 771 (1987) (discussing rela-
tionship between American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws).
3. Article 9 was last revised in a comprehensive way over twenty years ago. See
STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
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typically tries to secure payment of the credit by taking a "blanket"
security interest in all or substantially all of the existing and after-
acquired assets of the debtor, including the "goodwill" of the debtor's
business. Unlike secured "asset based" credit, if the debtor is unable
to generate the requisite cash flow or stops doing business, liquidating
the debtor's assets will probably not generate sufficient proceeds to
repay the lender. When a cash flow loan becomes troubled, the
lender's "workout" strategy is often to assist the debtor in a financial
or operational restructuring, or a sale of all or some part of the
debtor's assets as a "going concern." Such a strategy may or may not
involve the debtor becoming a debtor under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
Assuming that the debtor continues operations, the secured cash
flow lender usually regards the premium comprising the debtor's go-
ing concern value over its liquidation value as a goodwill element that
is captured by the lender's security interest. In Article 9 terms, a
goodwill element is classified as a "general intangible."4 The lender's
argument is that if the debtor's assets were sold as a going concern,
the sales proceeds, including the goodwill premium, would belong to
the secured creditor as proceeds of the collateral regardless of how a
buyer itself may allocate the purchase price among the assets.
In many instances, in an enforcement or bankruptcy context, the
cash flow lender's assertion of its entitlement to the entire proceeds of
the sale of the debtor's assets5 goes unchallenged.
In other instances, however, the lender's assertion is challenged
in a serious fashion by a bankruptcy trustee, creditors' committee, or
the like where the going concern value of the debtor's business is de-
pendent upon nonassignable contracts or permits in favor of the
debtor. The argument against the secured lender capturing the
debtor's going concern value as part of its security interest is framed
along the following lines: The debtor cannot grant to the secured
lender a security interest in the particular contract or permit because
it is by its terms nonassignable. In other words, the debtor has no
rights in this particular item of collateral in which to grant a security
interest. If the lender has no security interest in that contract or per-
mit, then the lender cannot have a security interest in the debtor's
going concern value. That is because, without that contract or permit,
4. See U.C.C. § 9-106 cmt. (1990) (stating that goodwill is example of general
intangible).
5. In a Chapter 11 plan, the lender would typically assert an interest in an amount
equal to the total appraised value of the debtor's business as a going concern.
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the debtor could not operate as a going concern at all. The most that
the lender can capture as part of its blanket Article 9 security interest
is the sales proceeds at liquidation prices or, in the context of valuing
the security interest in a Chapter 11 plan, the liquidation value of the
individual assets of the debtor in which the lender's security interest
has attached and become perfected. But the going concern value of
the debtor's assets in excess of the liquidation value of those assets,
the argument goes, belongs not to the secured creditor but to general
unsecured creditors or, if the debtor is a debtor in a bankruptcy case,
to the bankruptcy estate.
While the secured lender may point to various provisions of the
UCC permitting its security interest in the otherwise nonassignable
contract or permit to attach, usually these provisions do not go far
enough. Although section 9-318(4) invalidates anti-assignment
clauses restricting the grant or enforcement of a security interest in an
account or general intangible for money due or to become due,6 it
does not provide much help to the lender if the contract or permit in
question does not involve payments to the debtor. Similarly, section
2-210(2) invalidates anti-assignment clauses relating to breach of con-
tract actions,7 but it does not provide assistance to the lender where
the contract is not for the sale of goods or where the other party to the
contract has not breached. Moreover, while revised section 2A-3038
would appear to permit, notwithstanding the existence of an anti-as-
signment clause, the grant of a security interest in the personal prop-
erty leasehold interest of a debtor-lessee, nevertheless the contract in
question must be a lease of goods governed by Article 2A.
Perhaps the secured lender could point to section 9-311 as au-
thority for the proposition that a debtor may always convey its interest
in a nonassignable contract or permit.9 But section 9-311 by its terms
only applies where the debtor already has rights in the collateral; it
does not create rights for the debtor in collateral which do not already
exist independent of section 9-311. A closer reading of the literal lan-
guage of section 9-311 indicates that the section assumes that the se-
cured party already has a security interest in the collateral that is to be
conveyed. Indeed, section 9-311, by its reference to a restriction on
transfer contained in a security agreement, appears to address a re-
striction on transfer that is not inherent in the collateral itself but is
6. U.C.C. § 9-318(4).
7. Id. § 2-210(2).
8. Id. § 2A-303 (Official Text 1990).
9. See id § 9-311.
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imposed by a supplemental agreement once the security interest has
already been created.
Furthermore, the argument that section 9-311 authorizes the
debtor to grant a security interest in a nonassignable contract or per-
mit may, even if successful, provide little solace to the lender. Unlike
section 9-318(4) or revised section 2A-303, section 9-311 does not, of
course, invalidate any rights of the party in whose favor the restriction
on transfer was made. Accordingly, that party may still have the right
to claim that, by the creation of the security interest, an event of de-
fault or other breach of contract or grounds for termination has oc-
curred. In such a case, the secured party would, absent a "hell or high
water" clause in the contract or permit which prohibits the assertion
of defenses,'" take its security interest subject to whatever those rights
are, including the rights of the other party to terminate the contract or
permit." That party may in some circumstances even have grounds to
bring an action against the secured party for tortious interference with
its contract or permit with the debtor.
A discerning critic, observing these limitations under the existing
UCC, might be tempted to say to the lender, "Too bad." Such credit
facilities, which have no traditional asset coverage in the form of real-
izable collateral value on liquidation, are inherently risky. A lender
that extends such credit facilities, the critic might say, deserves little
sympathy from Article 9.
I would offer two responses to that critic. First, cash flow credit
facilities have become an increasingly vital means for businesses to
raise credit in this country. We see them in the "high tech" industry,
in the media and entertainment industry, and in the financial services
industry, among others. As our economy becomes more service based
than manufacturing based, they may become even more common as a
structure for financing businesses. To the extent that Article 9 can
provide greater protections to secured lenders under these facilities,
arguably the cost of credit to debtors under these facilities should be
lower, and some businesses which might otherwise not be financed
will obtain financing. Article 9 would then be fulfilling one of its pur-
poses of permitting the continued expansion of commercial
practices.' 2
Second, the protections that Article 9 could afford to such lenders
with respect to otherwise nonassignable contracts and permits would
10. See Ud § 9-206.
11. See id. § 9-318(1).
12. See id. § 1-102(2)(b).
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not be so dramatic as to encourage the financing of businesses that, as
a matter of prudent credit analysis, should not be financed at all. The
protections that are suggested in this Essay would be relatively mod-
est. They would be helpful to a secured lender where the debtor's
business continues-whether in the hands of the debtor or a third
party-as a going concern, but they would provide little protection to
the Secured lender where the debtor's business is liquidated. More-
over, even where the lender is well aware of the risks of taking a se-
curity interest in nonassignable contract and permit rights of its debtor
and refuses to proceed with the credit transaction until those risks are
eliminated by the obtaining of third-party consents, these suggestions
for revising Article 9 may minimize the need for those consents or the
transaction costs in obtaining them. Thus, while a revised Article 9
would enable a lender to extend credit in more situations, it would not
affect the lender's overall credit judgment that it needs to be pro-
tected from those risks before it extends the credit.
III. EXAMPLES
The following examples illustrate situations where the issue of the
extent of a secured lender's security interest in a debtor's nonassigna-
ble contract or permit rights might arise.
A. Example 1
Debtor is in the business of developing and licensing customized
computer software to end users. The software is based on a special
program licensed to Debtor by Big Licensor. Under the terms of
Debtor's license agreement with Big Licensor, Debtor is permitted to
modify and sublicense Big Licensor's software as an element of
Debtor's customized software. Although Big Licensor has licensed a
large number of licensees on this basis, each license, including that
which Debtor has entered into with Big Licensor, requires Big Licen-
sor's consent to any assignment by Debtor, whether by encumbrance
or otherwise, of Debtor's rights in the license agreement. Bank pro-
vides working capital to Debtor and claims a security interest in all of
Debtor's assets. Bank monitors Debtor's performance based upon
covenants designed to insure that Debtor's projected earnings will be
more than sufficient for Debtor to pay its debt service. When
Debtor's financial performance deteriorates, it files for bankruptcy.
Buyer acquires Debtor's business out of the bankruptcy for cash and,
as part of that transaction, obtains Big Licensor's consent to the as-
signment to Buyer of Debtor's license agreement with Big Licensor.
[Vol. 28:335
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Debtor's bankruptcy trustee, while acknowledging that Bank is enti-
tled to the nominal cash proceeds attributable to Debtor's goods and
accounts, contests Bank's entitlement to the balance of the cash pro-
ceeds. The bankruptcy trustee claims that these proceeds are attribu-
table to Debtor's ability to create a future stream of earnings and that
that earnings stream would not have been possible if Buyer were not
also acquiring Debtor's license from Big Licensor. Because Bank's
security interest in that license never attached, the bulk of the sales
proceeds are not proceeds of Bank's collateral.13
B. Example 2
Debtor is in the cable television business. It provides cable tele-
vision services to numerous communities under franchise agreements
with those communities. Each agreement provides that the franchise
may not be assigned, by encumbrance or otherwise, without the com-
munity franchisor's consent. Bank has provided financing to Debtor
to enable Debtor to acquire cable television equipment and to install
hookups in each community and for general working capital purposes.
Bank has claimed to have taken a security interest in all of Debtor's
assets to secure that financing. Bank monitors Debtor's performance
based upon covenants designed to insure that Debtor's expected cus-
tomer subscription revenues after operating expenses will be more
than sufficient to pay Debtor's debt service. Experiencing fierce com-
petition, Debtor decides to sell several franchises to Buyer, a compet-
ing cable television company, for cash. Buyer attends several public
hearings held by the franchisor communities and obtains their permis-
sion for Debtor to assign the franchises to Buyer. At the closing, the
cash proceeds of the sale are paid to Bank. Sixty days later, Debtor
files for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee claims that Bank was un-
dersecured because it did not have a security interest in the franchises.
Therefore, from the trustee's perspective, any proceeds that Bank re-
ceived in excess of the value of Debtor's other assets in which Bank
had a perfected and unavoidable security interest was a preference
and recoverable under the Bankruptcy Code.' 4
13. Cf In re Specialty Foods, Inc., 98 B.R. 734, 735 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding
that lender's security interest in debtor's "rights to the payment of money however evi-
denced or arising including each existing and future... general intangible... with all
trademarks" did not include, within grant of security interest, security interest in debtor's
rights as licensee under trademark licensing agreement so as to entitle lender to proceeds
of sale of debtor's rights in that licensing agreement).
14. Compare First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Clam Co., 535 F. Supp. 266,
268 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that lender's security interest in general intangibles extends to
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C. Example 3
Debtor operates a hotel. Bank has provided financing to Debtor
to acquire the property and build the hotel and is being repaid out of
ongoing hotel receipts. To secure that financing, Bank has taken a
real estate mortgage over the hotel and claims a security interest in all
of Debtor's personal property assets. Debtor files for Chapter 11. At
the time, Bank's loan is $20,000,000; the appraised value of Debtor's
hotel, if sold as a going concern, is $25,000,000; and the appraised
value of Debtor's real estate, goods, and accounts, if sold at liquida-
tion, is $15,000,000. Debtor proposes a Chapter 11 plan which values
Bank's secured claim at $15,000,000. Debtor claims that the premium
of $10,000,000 of going concern value over liquidation value is attribu-
table to Debtor's ability to operate a hotel. That operation, however,
requires a liquor license for Debtor's restaurant and bar facilities.
And Bank does not have an attached security interest in Debtor's li-
quor license which, under applicable state law, could not be "as-
signed" without the local liquor license authority's consent. That
consent never having been obtained, Bank's security interest must be
valued at what Bank could realize on liquidation of Debtor's real
property, goods, and accounts, that is, only $15,000,000.1-
These few examples highlight what is becoming an increasingly
problematic situation for secured cash flow lenders. With any ongoing
business, the debtor's otherwise nonassignable contract and permit
rights may in fact be assigned as part of a sale of the debtor's business
or otherwise have to be valued in the context of a bankruptcy reorgan-
ization. Lenders that have provided financing based upon the cash
flow of the business and believe that that financing is secured by the
value that a third party would attribute to that cash flow are often
proceeds of sale of debtor's arguably nontransferable clamming license) with In re Amer-
eco Envtl. Servs., Inc., 129 B.R. 197, 198 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that lender's
security interest in general intangibles does not extend to purchase price of debtor's assets
allocable to nonassignable hazardous waste operating permits reissued in name of buyer).
15. See Bogus v. American Nat'l Bank, 401 F.2d 458, 460-61 (10th Cir. 1968) (holding
that security interest in debtor's liquor license was valid where state statute was narrowly
construed to prohibit involuntary attachment or other judicial lien, but not to prohibit
grant of security interest). Compare In re Rudy's Inc., 23 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1981) (holding that lender's security interest in debtor's liquor license was invalid where
state liquor license commission, by administrative regulation, prohibited granting security
interest in liquor license) with In re Pike, 62 B.R. 765,769 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986) (hold-
ing that where state liquor control act did not expressly prohibit grant of security interest
in liquor licenses and administrative rule prohibiting such security interest was issued with-
out proper legislative authority, Article 9 security interest in debtor's liquor license was
valid).
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unaware, or not fully aware, of how much of that cash flow depends
upon those otherwise nonassignable rights. Although the lender's fi-
nancing may have helped to create that cash flow and third-party con-
tract and permit rights are not being affected upon a sale or
bankruptcy valuation of the debtor's business, other creditors are
often able to claim that some portion of the value of the debtor's busi-
ness attributable to that cash flow has not been included in the
lender's security interest.
IV. CASES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
Some recent related court decisions on the federal level deserve
particular comment. Because the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's (FCC) regulations prohibit the encumbrance of an FCC broad-
cast license, several courts have had to face the issue of whether a
lender's Article 9 security interest may attach to a debtor's FCC
broadcast license. The issue becomes acutely relevant in valuing the
secured party's collateral in the bankruptcy of a debtor broadcaster
because a broadcaster's assets are virtually worthless without its abil-
ity to transfer its FCC license to a third party, albeit subject to FCC
consent.
So far the Seventh Circuit in In re Tak Communications, Inc.
16
has taken the approach that the anti-encumbrance provisions of the
FCC's regulations prohibit a security interest in an FCC license from
attaching where the debtor has granted to the secured party a security
interest in the debtor's general intangibles.17 Accordingly, without the
value of the debtor's business attributable to those licenses being cap-
tured by their security interest, the syndicate banks claiming a security
interest in the debtor's FCC licenses were significantly undersecured,
and the benefit of the debtor's going concern value passed to the
bankruptcy estate.
But lower courts in other circuits have declined to follow the Tak
decision. These courts have viewed the secured party's security inter-
est in general intangibles, while not comprising a broadcast license it-
self, as somehow encompassing a proprietary right of the debtor
prospectively to receive proceeds of a transfer of the broadcast license
if and when a transfer of the broadcast license were to take place.18 In
16. 985 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1993).
17. Id. at 918-19.
18. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Arrow Communications, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 41,48-49
(D. Mass. 1993); In re Thomas Communications, Inc., 161 B.R. 621, 626-27 (Bankr. S.D.
W. Va. 1993); In re Ridgely Communications, Inc., 139 B.R. 374, 379-80 (Bankr. D. Md.
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facing a like argument from an Article 9 secured party over the pro-
ceeds of a consensual termination by a bankruptcy debtor of a nonas-
signable automobile franchise agreement, an Illinois bankruptcy court
found these lower court arguments persuasive and, notwithstanding its
situs in the Seventh Circuit, courageously held for the secured party.19
While the efforts of these lower courts are sympathetic, they are
not without controversy. Normally, a secured party's security interest
in proceeds of collateral does not attach until the proceeds are cre-
ated.20 If the debtor's interest in an asset in which the secured party
had not perfected its security interest were sold during the preference
period prior to the debtor's bankruptcy, any claim of the secured party
to a then perfected security interest in the proceeds of the sale of that
asset would be subject to preference attack.2' If the interest were sold
post-petition, the secured party's claim to the proceeds of the sale of
that asset would be cut off by Bankruptcy Code section 552 because
the proceeds would not be proceeds of collateral in which the secured
party had an unavoidable perfected pre-petition security interest.22
To say that a secured party, however, may perfect its security in-
terest today in a right to receive proceeds tomorrow-without
perfecting its security interest today in the underlying collateral-
proves too much under the current version of Article 9. If accepted,
the argument would permit a secured party, for example, to perfect a
security interest today in a right to receive ongoing payments under a
promissory note where the secured party had failed to perfect its se-
curity interest in the promissory note by taking possession of it. That
is certainly not the law today.2 Further, it is difficult to see a distinc-
tion between underlying collateral consisting of a promissory note
where the secured party has failed to take possession of the note in
order to perfect its security interest and underlying collateral consist-
ing of a nonassignable contract or permit where the secured party has
failed to obtain a waiver of the valid nonassignability provision in or-
der to permit the secured party's security interest to attach. If creat-
ing a security interest in a right to receive proceeds in the future as a
1992); cf. In re Cheskey, 9 F.C.C.R. 986, 986-87 (1994) (holding that security interest in
proceeds of sale of license does not violate Commission's policy of preventing creditors
from obtaining licenses through foreclosure without Commission's approval).
19. In re SRJ Enters., Inc., 150 B.R. 933, 941 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1993).
20. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (stating debtor must have rights in collateral for security
interest to attach).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1988).
22. See id. § 552.
23. In re Melon Produce, Inc., 976 F.2d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 1992).
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separate item of collateral is not possible in one case, it would seem
that it should not be possible in others as well.
Nevertheless, these lower court decisions may well be justified in
their regulatory context. These courts have interpreted the FCC's reg-
ulations in ways that confine their impact to the regulatory framework
in which they arose. They have done so by interpreting the FCC's
regulations to leave the debtor licensee with some proprietary interest
in its FCC license, a proprietary interest that is capable of being en-
cumbered so long as the FCC's regulatory scheme is not prejudiced by
the private contractual arrangements between the debtor and its cred-
itors. In doing so, these courts struggled with the anomaly that,
notwithstanding prohibitions on the encumbrance of the debtor's
rights under the license involved, those prohibitions were designed to
serve particular regulatory objectives that have little relevance to how
proceeds of the transfer of the debtor's rights in the license, even with
FCC consent, are divided among the debtor's creditors.
In narrowing the reach of the FCC's anti-encumbrance regula-
tions to serve the purpose for which they were designed, these lower
court decisions provide guidance to a more general statutory approach
applicable to all contracts and permits where anti-assignment provi-
sions are present.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISED ARTICLE 9
The Article 9 that emerges from the current revision process
might contain a provision by which assignment prohibitions relating to
contracts and permits are ineffective where such prohibitions (1)
would otherwise prevent a security interest in the debtor's rights in
the contract or permit from attaching, or (2) would create a default by
the debtor under the contract or permit. That same provision might
also contemplate that enforcement of that security interest would be
permitted only if (1) the consent of the third party, which is a party to
the contract or has issued the permit, is not required under the terms
of the contract or permit or on account of other applicable law, or (2)
the third party in fact consents to any assignment effected by enforce-
ment of the security interest. Absent any of those circumstances,
however, the assignment prohibition and event of default would be
given full effect with regard to any intended enforcement of the secur-
ity interest.
The invalidation of an anti-assignment provision in a contract or
permit so as to allow a security interest to attach deserves further ex-
planation. Anti-assignment provisions, of course, are usually designed
November 1994]
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to prevent fights granted by contract or permit by a particular party or
issuer from being given to someone not qualified or deserving, in the
opinion of that party or issuer, to exercise those fights. In Example 1
above, Big Licensor does not want its software modified and custom-
ized by someone who might botch the job and leave Big Licensor with
a black eye in the marketplace. In Example 2, each community
franchisor wants to make sure that cable television services are pro-
vided to its community by someone who has both the expertise and
financial resources to provide those services. In Example 3, the liquor
licensing authority would want to make sure that, among other things,
liquor is sold only by those in a position and having a record of
responsibility.
But none of the legitimate interests of these third parties are be-
ing undermined or otherwise affected by permitting a secured lender's
security interest in the debtor's fights in the contract or permit merely
to attach. Attachment alone would provide inchoate rights to a se-
cured lender; that is, rights that would be meaningful if the secured
lender were to enforce its security interest. But, short of enforcement
by the secured lender, it is hard to see why the transferability concerns
of the third party do not remain protected. Indeed, it would appear to
be this very distinction-between attachment of a security interest
where third-party rights are not affected and enforcement of the se-
curity interest where third-party rights might well be affected-that
lead to revised section 2A-303(3) invalidating clauses in Article 2A
leases which would prevent a debtor-lessee from granting a security
interest in its leasehold interest in the leased goods.
2 4
It would likewise make sense that an event of default arising
under the contract or permit on account of the debtor's granting a
security interest to its lender should not be given effect short of en-
forcement of the security interest. Once again, the legitimate rights
and concerns of the third party to the contract or the third party that
issued the permit are not being affected. So long as that is the case,
the third party should not have the ability to terminate the contract or
permit or to bring an action against the lender for tortious
interference.
24. See U.C.C. § 2A-303(3) (Official Text 1990) (stating that provision in lease agree-
ment making creation of security interest in interest of party to lease in event of default is
unenforceable unless or until lessee transfers its right of possession or use); cf. id. § 9-
318(4) (stating that provision in contract between account debtor and assignor prohibiting
creation of security interest in general intangible for money due or requiring account
debtor's consent to such security interest is unenforceable).
[Vol. 28:335
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Nevertheless, upon enforcement of the security interest, the third
party's interest in preventing an unapproved transfer of the debtor's
rights under the contract or permit should be protected. Assignment
prohibitions in contracts and permits, and related events of default
arising upon unapproved transfers, should be valid as a general matter
and honored by Article 9 in security interest enforcement situations.
It is not unusual for a security interest to attach without the se-
cured party being able to exercise remedies upon a default of the obli-
gations secured. The Supreme Court, approximately sixty years ago,
validated security interest-like status in favor of the Chicago Board of
Trade.' The Board, which was owed unpaid membership dues by one
of its members, could not compel the member to sell his seat on the
Board to pay for unpaid dues.26 But under the terms of the Board
membership agreement, the Board was entitled, if the debtor member
did decide to sell his seat, to withhold its permission for the seat to be
sold unless the unpaid dues were paid.27 The Supreme Court upheld
the Board's ability to require payment of the unpaid dues as a condi-
tion to the sale of the membership seat even though the Board itself
had no ability to force such a sale.28 Furthermore, "toothless" security
interests often exist in practice. For example, junior secured parties
fairly routinely obtain waivers of inferior lien restrictions from senior
secured parties. These waivers are often granted by senior secured
parties on the condition, evidenced by an intercreditor agreement,
that (1) the junior secured party acknowledge to the senior secured
party that the junior secured party's security interest is in fact junior,
and (2) the junior secured party agree with the senior secured party
that the junior secured party will not exercise remedies without the
senior secured party's consent.
However, there are two instances where those prohibitions on
transfer contained in the otherwise nonassignable contract or permit,
even on enforcement of a security interest, should not be respected.
First, the prohibitions should not be respected where the secured
lender can show that the transfer, if made directly by the debtor,
would be permitted by the contract, permit, or other applicable law.
For example, a contract, permit, or other applicable law may allow the
debtor to transfer its rights in the contract or permit to anyone within
a class of permitted transferees who have already been approved by
25. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
26. Id. at 14.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 15.
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the third party to the contract, or by the third party that has issued the
permit, but not to any transferee who does not fall within that class.
A sale by the secured lender at a public or private sale pursuant to
section 9-504 to a member of that class should be permitted even
though, as a technical matter, the secured lender is arguably itself an
unauthorized transferee momentarily in the "chain of title" relating to
the transfer of the contract or permit. Second, the otherwise prohib-
ited transfer by way of enforcement of a security interest should, of
course, be permitted where the third party has in fact consented to the
transfer. In this way, the secured lender would be able to retain
whatever value is attributable to the otherwise nonassignable contract
or permit as part of its security interest, less any cost to the secured
lender of obtaining that third party's consent.
If a revised Article 9 were to address the issue of the debtor's
ability to grant a security interest in an otherwise nonassignable con-
tract or permit in this manner, the legitimate rights of third parties
would remain protected. However, as may be the case under existing
law, those third-party rights would not extend beyond protecting the
third party itself. In particular, restrictions on assignment of contracts
or permits would not be used as a means of allocating the value of
those contracts and permits in the hands of the debtor among the
debtor's secured lender and other creditors when the third party's
rights are not being affected.
VI. LIMITATIONS OF ARTICLE 9
Even if these suggestions were adopted, they would not address
for a cash flow lender every situation where the lender wished to take
a security interest in an otherwise nonassignable contract or permit of
its debtor. Federal governmental permits may remain nonassignable,
even as collateral security, where federal law in fact prohibits the en-
cumbering of such permits.29 State or local governmental permits may
also remain nonassignable, even as collateral security, where a state
expressly chooses to adopt a rule for that governmental permit con-
trary to that suggested here for Article 9.
29. U.C.C. § 9-104(a). Compare In re Rainbo Express, Inc., 179 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir.)
(holding that certificates of public convenience, issued by Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion as nontransferable, may be subject to valid mortgage), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981
(1950) with Stephens Indus., Inc. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding
that FCC antireversionary interest rules do not permit seller to retain purchase money
security interest in broadcast license transferred to buyer as part of sale of broadcast
station).
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Moreover, where the debtor becomes a debtor under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, other issues may arise. Notwithstanding that Article 9
may render invalid an anti-assignment provision in a contract or per-
mit, the contract or permit may not be capable of assignment or as-
sumption by the debtor, either because of the nature of the contract or
permit)3 0 or because of the inability of the debtor to meet the require-
ments for assumption or transfer.31 Furthermore, even where the con-
tract or permit is capable of assumption or assignment by the debtor,
if the ability of the debtor to assume or assign the contract arises
solely by virtue of the invalidation of anti-assignment clauses under
the Bankruptcy Code itself,32 the trustee may claim that the secured
lender is not entitled to any benefit arising on account of that invalida-
tion. This is based upon the theory that any such benefit so effected
by the Bankruptcy Code should flow to the bankruptcy estate rather
than to a particular creditor otherwise not entitled to that benefit
under nonbankruptcy law.33
In revising Article 9, these limitations should not be overlooked.
Nevertheless, these limitations do not justify a revised Article 9's fail-
ure to address the issue of a debtor granting to its secured lender a
security interest in otherwise nonassignable contract or permit rights
in so far as it can.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)-(2) (1988).
31. Id. § 365(b), (f).
32. Id § 365(0.
33. Cf. James F. Queenan, Jr., Standards for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter
11, 92 COM. L.. 18, 62-63 (1988).
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